Crawford v. Washington: Reframing the Right to Confrontation

By Jeffrey L. Fisher*

* Associate Professor at Stanford Law School and lead counsel for the petitioners in the U.S. Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington, Davis v. Washington, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, and Bullcoming v. New Mexico. This outline incorporates post-Crawford decisions through May 14, 2012. In areas generating controversy, I have tried to include all relevant decisions. In other areas, I often provide only a few representative cases.
## TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. OVERVIEW AND THE GENERAL RULE ................................................................. 1

II. “TESTIMONIAL” EVIDENCE .................................................................................. 1

A. General Considerations ................................................................................... 1
   1. Potential definitions of testimonial ................................................................. 1
   2. Confrontation Clause’s historical roots and purposes ................................. 1
   3. Defining qualities of testimonial statements ................................................. 2
   4. Relevance of hearsay law (or “firmly rooted” hearsay exceptions) and reliability ................................................................. 3

B. Applications to Specific Kinds of Statements ................................................... 4
   1. Prior testimony .............................................................................................. 4
   2. Allocutions, guilty pleas, and other formal statements admitting guilt .......... 5
   3. “Letters” ........................................................................................................ 5
   4. Police stationhouse interrogations ............................................................... 5
   5. Statements during police interviews in the field but not in the vicinity of the scene of a crime ................................................................. 5
   6. Dying declarations ......................................................................................... 5
   7. Identifications at lineups or showups ............................................................ 6
   8. Statements to officers responding to scene of a suspected crime ............... 6
      a. “Ongoing emergency” .............................................................................. 6
      b. “Primary purpose” .................................................................................... 7
   9. 911 calls ......................................................................................................... 7
  10. Statements of elderly or dependent adult victims to law enforcement officials . 8
  11. Domestic violence accusations to obtain protection orders ....................... 8
  12. Child hearsay statements describing abuse ............................................... 8
      a. To law enforcement officers .................................................................. 8
      b. To state-employed child interview specialists ....................................... 8
      c. To state social workers or child protective services workers during “risk assessment interviews” ......................................................... 9
      d. To private therapists or victims’ services personnel ............................... 9
      e. To medical providers ............................................................................. 9
      f. To school employees ............................................................................. 10
      g. To family members ............................................................................... 10
  13. Statements to private investigators or to private victims’ services organizations ................................................................. 10
  14. Statements to medical providers .................................................................. 10
      a. Police already involved .......................................................................... 10
      b. Police not yet directly involved ............................................................. 11
         i. SANE nurses and similar medical/forensic examiners ......................... 11
         ii. Treating paramedics, doctors and nurses ......................................... 11
  15. Statements to friends/family/acquaintances ............................................... 12
  16. Statements of confidential informants ......................................................... 12
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Statements to confidential informants or undercover officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Statements made to prosecution’s expert witnesses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Statements regarding potential future crimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Forensic reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Machine-generated printouts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Equipment maintenance certifications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Medical records</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Law enforcement records</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>Police reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>Bench warrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>Reports of deportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>Booking records</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Other reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>Certification of jurisdictional element of crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>Disciplinary records</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Certifications concerning business or public records</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>Certifications of nonexistence of records (CNR’s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>Affidavits or certifications describing or summarizing records</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>Certifications of authenticity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Chain-of-custody affidavits</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Nontestimonial Statements

III. ADMISSIBILITY OF TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE

A. Witness Takes the Stand

1. Witness claims memory loss
2. Witness invokes privilege
3. Witness does not give substantive testimony on direct examination
4. Witness refuses or is unable to answer questions on cross-examination
5. Defendant needs interpreter to understand witness
6. Witness is no longer on the stand
7. Witness testifies based on another person’s testimonial statements
   a. Police officer testimony
   b. Forensic testimony

B. Waivers and Stipulations

1. Simple “notice and demand” statutes
2. Notice and demand statutes requiring pretrial showings or affirmations from defendant
3. Requiring defendant to subpoena witness

C. Unavailability and a Prior Opportunity for Cross-Examination

1. Unavailability
   a. Physical unavailability
   i. Death
ii. Government cannot locate witness at time of trial ........................................... 21
iii. Witness is beyond the court’s jurisdiction ......................................................... 21
iv. Witness has been deported ................................................................................. 21
v. Witness refuses to testify on pain of contempt .................................................... 22
vi. Illness .................................................................................................................. 22
b. Mental infirmity ..................................................................................................... 22
i. Incompetency ......................................................................................................... 22
ii. Inability to remember (feigned or actual) ............................................................ 22
c. Invocation of privilege .......................................................................................... 22
d. Defendant procures witness’s absence ................................................................. 22

2. Prior opportunity for cross-examination ............................................................. 22
a. Pretrial hearings ..................................................................................................... 23
b. Discovery depositions ........................................................................................... 23
c. Pre-indictment depositions ................................................................................... 23
d. Civil cases ............................................................................................................. 23
e. Later arising evidence ........................................................................................... 23
f. Counsel for someone else cross-examined ........................................................... 24

D. Equitable Loss of the Right .................................................................................. 24
1. “Forfeiture by wrongdoing” .................................................................................. 24
   a. Alleged wrongdoing that causes unavailability but is not specifically 
      aimed at preventing testimony .......................................................................... 25
   b. Collusion with witness ....................................................................................... 25
   c. Coconspirator causes unavailability ................................................................. 25
   d. Threats/promises unconnected to investigation or prosecution ....................... 25
   e. Defendant absconds ........................................................................................... 25
   f. Domestic violence ............................................................................................... 25
   g. Retaliation for previous testimony ..................................................................... 25
2. “Opening the door” ................................................................................................. 25

E. Testimonial Statements Offered for a Nonhearsay Purpose ............................ 26
1. Statements purportedly offered to explain police’s investigation ....................... 26
2. Testimonial statements offered as support for the opinion of prosecutorial 
   expert witnesses ..................................................................................................... 27

V. HARMLESS ERROR .............................................................................................. 27
I. OVERVIEW AND THE GENERAL RULE

The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause sets forth the basic condition required for prosecution testimony: “The accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” This means, generally speaking, that the prosecution must present its witnesses in court, under oath, face-to-face with the defendant, and make them available for cross examination. And in order to protect the integrity of this confrontation requirement, the Clause must preclude the introduction of certain out-of-court statements. Specifically, “[w]here testimonial [hearsay] is at issue,” the Sixth Amendment forbids the prosecution from introducing it unless the declarant testifies at trial or the right to confrontation is otherwise sufficiently honored. *Crawford v. Washington*, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (emphasis added). This outline concerns the scope of that exclusionary rule. It first addresses what kinds of evidence is testimonial. It then addresses various scenarios in which testimonial statements might be admissible, notwithstanding *Crawford’s* general exclusionary rule.

II. “TESTIMONIAL” EVIDENCE

A. General Considerations

1. Potential definitions of testimonial

   a. An assertion “made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.” *Melendez-Diaz*, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 (quoting *Crawford*, 541 U.S. at 52).


   c. “To rank as ‘testimonial,’ a statement must have a ‘primary purpose’ of ‘establish[ing] or prov[ing] past events potentially relevant to a later criminal prosecution.’” *Bullcoming v. New Mexico*, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2714 n.6 (2011) (plurality) (quoting *Davis v. Washington*, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006)); see also *Michigan v. Bryant*, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1165 (2011) (“[T]he ultimate touchstone of the testimonial inquiry . . . is whether the ‘primary purpose’ of the interrogation” was to enable the police to resolve an ongoing emergency or to establish past events potentially relevant to a later criminal prosecution.”).

2. Confrontation Clause’s historical roots and purposes

   a. “[T]he principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of *ex parte* examinations as evidence against the accused. . . . The Sixth Amendment must be interpreted with this focus in mind.” *Crawford*, 541 U.S. at 50.

   b. “Involvement of government officers in the production of testimony with an eye toward *trial* presents unique potential for prosecutorial abuse – a fact borne out time and again throughout history.” *Crawford*, 541 U.S. at 56 n.7 (emphasis added).
c. “[W]hen the government is involved in the statements’ production and when the statements describe past events,” the statements “implicate the core concerns of the old ex parte affidavit practice.” Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 137 (1999) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added), quoted in part in Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2276.

d. “Historically, the inclusion of the Confrontation Clause in the Bill of Rights reflected the Framers’ conviction that the defendant must not be denied the opportunity to challenge his accusers in a direct encounter before the trier of fact.” Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 78 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

e. “[A]n out-of-court accusation is universally conceded to be constitutionally inadmissible against the accused . . . .” Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 138 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis added); accord California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 179 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]he Confrontation Clause was meant to constitutionalize a barrier against flagrant abuses, trials by anonymous accusers, and absentee witnesses.”) (emphasis added); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986) (“The Confrontation Clause . . . ensures that convictions will not be based on the charges of unseen and unknown – and hence unchallengeable – individuals.”).

f. “[T]he most important instances in which the Clause restricts the introduction of out-of-court statements are those in which state actors are involved in a formal, out-of-court interrogation of a witness to obtain evidence for trial.” Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011).

3. Defining qualities of testimonial statements

a. “An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (emphasis added).

b. “The Framers were no more willing to exempt from cross-examination volunteered testimony or answers to open-ended questions than they were to exempt answers from detailed interrogation. . . . [I]t is in the final analysis the declarant’s statements, not [any] interrogator’s questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate.” Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2274 n.1; see also Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2535 (“a person who volunteers his testimony” is not “any less a ‘witness against’ the defendant” than one who responds to interrogation”).

c. “What [the declarant to the 911 operator in Davis] said was not ‘a weaker substitute for live testimony’ at trial.” When “the ex parte actors and the evidentiary products of the ex parte communication align[] perfectly with their courtroom analogues,” statements are testimonial. But “[n]o ‘witness’ goes into court to proclaim an emergency and seek help.” Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2277. Statements that “deliberately recount[][, in response to police questioning, how potentially criminal events began and progressed” are testimonial “because they do precisely what a witness does on direct examination.” Id. at 2278; see also Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 (certificates that are “functionally
identical to live, in-court testimony, doing ‘precisely what a witness does on direct examination’” are testimonial).

d. “We do not dispute that formality is indeed essential to testimonial utterance. . . . It imports sufficient formality, in our view, that lies to [police] officers are criminal offenses.” *Davis*, 126 S. Ct. at 2278 n.5. In addition, “the absence of an oath is not dispositive in determining if a statement is testimonial.” *Bullcoming*, 131 S. Ct. at 2717.

e. “We can safely assume that the [declarants] were aware of the affidavits’ evidentiary purpose.” *Melendez-Diaz*, 129 S. Ct. at 2532.

f. A statement need not “directly accuse [the defendant] of wrongdoing” to be testimonial. The Confrontation Clause applies to all testimony offered by the prosecution. *Melendez-Diaz*, 129 S. Ct. at 2533.

g. A declarant need not have “observe[d] the crime” or “any action related to it” to make testimonial statements. A record of contemporaneous observations of the crime scene or other evidence, made after the fact, is testimonial. *Melendez-Diaz*, 129 S. Ct. at 2535.

h. A declarant need not apply “interpretation” or “independent judgment” to external observations in order to make testimonial statements. *Bullcoming*, 131 S. Ct. at 2717.

4. **Relevance of hearsay law (or “firmly rooted” hearsay exceptions), and reliability**

None! The central holding of *Crawford* is that the Confrontation Clause is a rule of criminal procedure, not of evidence. Accordingly, the constitutional admissibility of statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used for evidentiary purposes no longer turns in any way on “the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less [on] some amorphous notions of ‘reliability.’” 541 U.S. at 61; see also *Bullcoming*, 131 S. Ct. at 2715 (“This Court settled in *Crawford* that the obvious reliability of a testimonial statement does not dispense with the Confrontation Clause.”). In other words, the constitutional considerations requiring testimonial statements to be subject to cross-examination in criminal cases “do[] not evaporate when testimony happens to fall within some broad, modern hearsay exception, even if that exception might be justifiable in other circumstances.” *Crawford*, 541 U.S. at 56 n.7.

In *Melendez-Diaz*, the Court elaborated on this principle, while responding to the Commonwealth’s argument that forensic laboratory reports were admissible as business or official records: “Business and public records are generally admissible [in criminal cases] absent confrontation not because they qualify under an exception to the hearsay rules, but because – having been created for the administration of an entity’s affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial – they are not testimonial. Whether or not they qualify as business or official records, the analysts’ statements here – prepared specifically for use at petitioner’s trial – were testimony against the petitioner, and the analysts were subject to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.” 129 S. Ct. at 2539-40. The Court further noted that it is irrelevant whether testimony recounting historical events is “prone to distortion or manipulation” or is “the resul[t] of neutral, scientific testing.” Forensic lab reports would be testimonial even if “all analysis always possessed the scientific acumen of Mme. Curie and the veracity of Mother Theresa.” *Id.* at 2537.
To be sure, the Court later noted in *Bryant* that in determining whether a statement was procured “with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony, . . . standard rules of hearsay, designed to identify some statements as reliable, will be relevant.” 131 S. Ct. at 1155. The Court further stated that “[i]mplicit in *Davis* is the idea that because the prospect of fabrication in statements given for the primary purpose of resolving that emergency is presumably significantly diminished, the Confrontation Clause does not require such statements to be subject to the crucible of cross-examination. This logic is not unlike that justifying the excited utterance exception in hearsay law. Statements relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition . . . are considered to be reliable because the declarant, in the excitement, presumably cannot form a falsehood. . . . An ongoing emergency has a similar effect of focusing an individual’s attention on responding to the emergency.” *Id.* at 1157 (internal citations omitted).

It is difficult to know exactly what to make of this passage. But it should not be overread. The Court acknowledges earlier in the opinion that *Crawford* “overrule[d]” the Roberts framework, and nothing in the passage mentions – much less purports to qualify or back away from – the statements in *Crawford* and *Melendez-Diaz* that render the rules of evidence and reliability irrelevant to the testimonial inquiry. So if the passage does not reintroduce reliability into confrontation law, then what does it do? It seems to mean, as the Court explains in a footnote attached to the end of it and as Justice Sotomayor added in her concurrence in *Bullcoming*, that when a statement satisfies a hearsay exception, it is likely to be nontestimonial because many hearsay exceptions “rest on the belief that certain statements are, by their nature, made for a purpose other than use in a prosecution.” *Bryant*, 131 S. Ct. at 1157 n.9; see also *Bullcoming*, 131 S. Ct. at 2720 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part) (“The hearsay rule’s recognition of the certificates’ evidentiary purpose thus confirmed our decision that the certificates were testimonial under the primary purpose analysis required by the Confrontation Clause.”). That is, some of the same things that hearsay law takes to indicate reliability also can indicate that a statement is nontestimonial. But there is no causal connection between the two – merely an overlap. The fact that a statement is reliable does not make it nontestimonial, for “[t]he rules of evidence, not the Confrontation Clause, are designed primarily to police reliability.” *Bullcoming*, 131 S. Ct. at 2720 n.1 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part).

**B. Applications to Specific Kinds of Statements**

The Court in *Crawford* describes the first three categories below as “paradigmatic” and “core” testimonial statements, 541 U.S. at 52, 63, suggesting that other types of statements are also testimonial. In other words, the confrontation right does not apply only to abuses at time of the Founding; it also applies to other types of statements that the Framers would have considered barred. *Id.* at 52 n.3.

1. **Prior testimony:** “Whatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial . . . .” *Crawford*, 541 U.S. at 68. The prior testimony need not have occurred in the same case and may be from a civil case or a foreign case. *See Simmons v. State*, 234 S.W.3d 321 (Ark. App. 2006) (deposition taken in anticipation of civil trial testimonial); *United States v. Causevic*, 636 F.3d 998 (8th Cir. 2011) (foreign case).
2. **Allocutions, guilty pleas, and other formal statements admitting guilt:** These are testimonial. *See Crawford*, 541 U.S. at 64, abrogating *United States v. Aguilar*, 295 F.3d 1018, 1021-23 (9th Cir. 2003), and similar holdings in other circuits allowing the admission of allocutions. *See also Kirby v. United States*, 174 U.S. 47, 53-60 (1899) (guilty pleas); *United States v. McClain*, 377 F.3d 219, 222 (2nd Cir. 2004) (allocation); *State v. Tollardo*, ___ P.3d ___, 2012 WL 1185974 (N.M. 2012) (guilty plea); United States v. Massino, 319 F. Supp. 2d 295 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (guilty pleas).

3. “Letters” to police or other governmental officials accusing someone of wrongdoing are testimonial. *Crawford*, 541 U.S. at 44 (noting that an accusatory “letter” was used against Sir Walter Raleigh); *see also* 1 James Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law in England 326 (1883) (common law confrontation right applied to “depositions, confessions of accomplices, letters, and the like”) (emphasis added), quoted in *California v. Green*, 399 U.S. 149, 156-57 (1970); *State v. Jensen*, 727 N.W.2d 518 (Wis. 2007) (letter directed to police testimonial).

4. **Police stationhouse interrogations:** *Crawford* expressly renders such statements testimonial. 541 U.S. at 68. “We use the term ‘interrogation’ in its colloquial, rather than any technical legal, sense.” *Id.* at 53 n.4. “[S]tructured police questioning” qualifies as an interrogation “under any conceivable definition.” *Id.*


8. **Statements to officers responding to scene of a suspected crime:** In *Davis*, the Court held that such “[s]tatements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74 (emphasis added). An interrogation, however, is not required to make such statements testimonial; “The Framers were no more willing to exempt from cross-examination volunteered testimony or answers to open-ended questions than they were to exempt answers from detailed interrogation. . . . [I]t is in the final analysis the declarant’s statements, not [any] interrogator’s questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate.” *Id.* at 2274 n.1. In the *Davis* opinion, the Court ruled that statements a woman made in *Hammon v. Indiana* in response to responding officers’ “initial inquiries” that “recounted . . . how potentially criminal past events began and progressed” were testimonial. *Id.* at 2278-79. Several years later, the Court held in *Michigan v. Bryant*, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011), that statements that police obtained from a shooting victim a few minutes after the shooting, in which he identified his assailant were nontestimonial. The Court followed a two-step process in reaching this conclusion, asking (a) whether an ongoing emergency existed and (b) if so, whether the primary purpose of the statements was to resolve the emergency. *See id.* at 1165 (explaining the two steps). Each step involves a multi-factor inquiries that are outlined below.

a. **“Ongoing emergency.”** The *Bryant* Court instructed that the question whether an “ongoing emergency” is a “highly context-dependent inquiry.” 131 S. Ct. at 1158. Factors that the Court specifically referenced were:

i. Whether any threat is “neutralized” or “continuing.” *Id.* at 1158. In *Hammon*, the threat was neutralized, because it “involved domestic violence” and the police were in control of the suspect. In contrast, in *Bryant*, there was a continuing threat because it involved “an armed shooter, whose motive for and location after the shooting, were unknown.” *Id.* at 1158, 1164; *accord People v. Burney*, 963 N.E.2d 430 (Ill. App. 2011).

ii. Whether a “threat[] to public safety” exists. In *Hammon*, no such threat existed because it involved a “purely private dispute.” *Id.* at 1163. *Bryant*, in contrast, involved a broader “zone of potential victims,” “encompass[ing] a threat
potentially to the police and the public.” Id. at 1158, 1164. Yet this factor does not “suggest[] that an emergency is ongoing in every place or even just surrounding the victim for the entire time that the perpetrator of a violent crime is on the loose.” Id. at 1159.

iii. The “type of weapon employed.” Id. at 1158. “Hershel Hammon was armed only with his fists when he attacked his wife, so removing Amy to a separate room was sufficient to end the emergency.” Id. at 1159. A gun is different.

iv. The “medical condition” of the victim. Id. at 1159.

b. Primary purpose: The Bryant Court explained that the primary purpose test is an “objective” test that “requires a combined inquiry that accounts for both the declarant and the interrogator” (to the extent there is one). 131 S. Ct. at 1160. Furthermore, courts “should determine the ‘primary purpose of the interrogation’ by objectively evaluating the statements and actions of the parties to the encounter, in light of the circumstances in which the interrogation occurs.” Id. at 1162. Again, several factors inform this inquiry. Among them:

i. Whether the declarant is seriously injured: “The medical condition of the victim is important to the primary purpose inquiry to the extent it sheds light on the ability of the victim to have any purpose at all in responding to police questions and on the likelihood that any purpose formed would necessarily be a testimonial one.” Id. at 1159.

ii. The formality of the statements: The degree of “[f]ormality in an encounter between a victim and the police” informs the primary purpose of an interrogation. Id. at 1159, 1166; see also Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2721 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part) (“formality suggests that the statement is intended for use at trial”). In Hammon, the interaction between the declarant and the officer was formal because the officers had “actively separated” her from the suspect and her statements “deliberately recounted, in response to police questioning, how potentially criminal past events began and progressed.” Davis, 547 U.S. at 830. By contrast, in Bryant, the circumstances were relatively informal because “the questioning . . . occurred in an exposed, public area, prior to the arrival of emergency medical services, and in a disorganized fashion.” 131 S. Ct. at 1160.

iii. Level of police knowledge at the time statements are obtained: In Bryant, the police “did not know why, where, or when the shooting had occurred. Nor did they know the location of the shooter or anything else about the circumstances in which the crime occurred.” 131 S. Ct. 1165. By contrast, where officers already have a sense of what happened and believe that it was criminal, it is more likely that statements are being obtained and given primarily for prosecutorial use.

9. 911 calls: The same general test – coined in Davis and elucidated in Bryant – applies here as in the responding officer context: such “[s]tatements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that
the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74 (emphasis added). For representative applications of this test, see Commonwealth v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280 (Mass. 2010) (parts of call right after shooting nontestimonial but parts unnecessary to enable response testimonial); Commonwealth v. Beatrice, 951 N.E.2d 26 (Mass. 2011) (call reporting completed domestic disturbance testimonial because accused had no weapon and posed no threat to general public).

One particularly tricky problem arises when a third party calls to report ongoing criminal activity in which the caller is not in any way involved. Compare Wilder v. Commonwealth, 687 S.E.2d 542 (Va. App. 2010) (call reporting larceny in progress testimonial), with United States v. Proctor, 505 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 2007) (call reporting felon in possession not testimonial); Key v. State, 657 S.E.2d 273 (Ga. App. 2008) (call reporting drunk driver not testimonial); Langley v. State, 28 A.3d 646 (Md. 2011) (call reporting just-completed murder/robbery not testimonial). But the same test should probably control: whether the caller’s primary purpose is to enable the police to resolve an “ongoing emergency” or to report factual assertions for use in a criminal investigation or prosecution.


12. Child hearsay statements describing abuse:

a. To law enforcement officers – Every court to address the issue has held that statements made during interviews with law enforcement officers are testimonial. See, e.g., Flores v. State, 120 P.3d 1170 (Nev. 2005); People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916 (Colo. 2006); Hobgood v. State, 926 So.2d 847 (Miss. 2006).

b. To state-employed child interview specialists – Courts unanimously have held that statements made during interviews done specifically to investigate and gather evidence for a criminal prosecution are testimonial. See, e.g., United States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548 (8th Cir. 2005) (child statements to “forensic interviewer” testimonial); People v.

c. To state social workers or child protective services workers during “risk assessment interviews” – Most courts have held that such statements are testimonial, regardless of whether the law enforcement personnel are involved in the interview or the interview is conducted at the behest of law enforcement. See State v. Henderson, 160 P.3d 776 (Kan. 2007); State v. Mack, 101 P.3d 349 (Or. 2004); State v. Norby, 180 P.3d 752 (Or. App. 2008); In re S.P., 215 P.3d 847 (Or. 2009); State v. Snowden, 867 A.2d 314 (Md. 2005); Flores v. State, 120 P.3d 1170 ( Nev. 2005); State v. Contreras, 979 So.2d 896 (Fla. 2008); T.P. v. State, 911 So.2d 1117 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004); D.G. v. State, 76 So.3d 852 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011) (same); Anderson v. State, 833 N.E.2d 119 (Ind. App. 2005); Rangel v. State, 199 S.W.3d 250 (Wash. App. 2007); Styron v. State, 34 So.2d 724 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009); but see State v. Arnold, 933 N.E.2d 775 (Ohio 2010) (holding that some statements to a social worker after the police were involved were testimonial but others were nontestimonial because they were made for purposes of medical treatment). But a significant minority treats such statements as nontestimonial when the police are not yet directly involved. See State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. 2006); State v. Muttart, 875 N.E.2d 944 (Ohio 2007); Seely v. State, 373 Ark. 141 (Ark. 2008); State v. Buda, 949 A.2d 761 (N.J. 2008).

d. To private therapists or victims’ services personnel – When such private personnel interview child victims in coordination with law enforcement, courts have held that resulting statements are testimonial. See State v. Blue, 717 N.W.2d 558 (N.D. 2006) (statements to private forensic interviewer working “in concert with or as an agent of” the police are testimonial); State v. Justus, 205 S.W.3d 872 (Mo. 2006); In re Rolandinis G., 902 N.E.2d 600 (I11. 2008); State v. Bentley, 739 N.W.2d 296 (Iowa 2007); People v. Sharp, 155 P.3d 577 (Colo. App. 2006); State v. Pitt, 147 P.3d 940 (Or. App. 2006), after reconsideration, 159 P.3d 329 (Or. App. 2007). But see Madden v. State, ___ So.3d ___, 2011 WL 5530439 (Miss. App. 2011) (statements nontestimonial even though police referred child to private organization after forensic interview). When the police are not directly involved, courts are divided over whether statements to such private personnel are testimonial. Compare People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753 (Cal. App. 2004) (child’s statement to child interview specialist at private victim assessment center was testimonial); Williams v. State, 970 So.2d 727 (Miss. App. 2007) (same; interview arranged by CPS), with State v. Sheppard, 842 N.E.2d 561 (Ohio App. 2005) (statement to private clinical counselor in mental health interview not testimonial); People v. Geno, 683 N.W.2d 687 (Mich. App. 2004) (statement to director of Children’s Assessment Center not testimonial); Lollis v. State, 232 S.W.3d 803 (Tex. App. 2007); Bishop v. State, 982 N.E.2d 775 (Ohio 2010) (holding that some statements to a social worker after the police were involved were testimonial but others were nontestimonial because they were made for purposes of medical treatment). But a significant minority treats such statements as nontestimonial when the police are not yet directly involved. See State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. 2006); State v. Muttart, 875 N.E.2d 944 (Ohio 2007); Seely v. State, 373 Ark. 141 (Ark. 2008); State v. Buda, 949 A.2d 761 (N.J. 2008).

e. To medical providers – Courts are divided over whether children’s statements, just like adults’ statements, to medical examiners are testimonial. See infra at I.I.D.14.

g. **To family members** – Courts unanimously have held that child statements given to family members before the police are involved are non-testimonial. *See, e.g., Hobgood v. State*, 926 So. 2d 847 (Miss. 2006) (statements to police testimonial but not statements to relatives before police were involved); *In re Rolandis G.*, 817 N.E.2d 183, 186 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (statement to mother not testimonial where “[t]here is no indication that [mother] suspected he had been the victim of a crime and that she was attempting to elicit evidence for a future prosecution”); *People v. R.F.*, 825 N.E.2d 287 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (divided decision holding that child’s accusation to mother and grandmother not testimonial; emphasizes need for government involvement); *State v. Walker*, 118 P.3d 935 (Wash. App. 2005) (statement to mom not testimonial); *State v. Shafer*, 128 P.3d 87 (Wash. 2006) (same regarding statements to mom and family friend). Courts have not yet grappled with situations in which family members have elicited statements from children expressly for use in criminal prosecutions. But it is not hard to imagine such a scenario and why it would raise serious questions. *Cf. State v. Brigman*, 615 S.E.2d 21 (N.C. App. 2005) (foster mother’s taped interview with child not testimonial).

13. **Statements to private investigators or to private victims’ services organizations:**

   If the setting was like an interview in that a reasonable declarant would reasonably have expected his statements to be used for evidentiary purposes, then it is testimonial even without governmental involvement, at least under the “reasonable declarant” definition of testimonial. *See Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles*, 86 Geo. L. Rev. 1011, 1038-43 (1998). For cases dealing with children’s statements to such organizations, see *supra* at II.D.12(d).

14. **Statements to medical providers:** Courts have generally distinguished between statements made after the police are involved and ones made before any authorities are aware of potentially criminal conduct.

a. **Police already involved:** If the police already are involved so that the examination is, in a sense, part of the investigation, then statements to a doctor or nurse are testimonial. *See State v. Hooper*, 176 P.3d 911 (Idaho 2007) (statement to nurse in forensic interview testimonial); *Hartsfield v. Commonwealth*, 277 S.W.3d 239 (Ky. 2009) (same); *State v. Cannon*, 254 S.W.3d 287 (Tenn. 2008) (same); *State v. Vega*, 236 P.3d 632 (Nev. 2010) (statement to nurse at child advocacy center); *State v. Romero*, 156 P.3d 694 (N.M. 2007) (statements to nurse accusing defendant of criminal acts testimonial); *Hernandez v. State*, 946 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. App. 2007); *People v. Spicer*, 884 N.E.2d 675, (Ill. App. 2008);
State v. Bennington, 264 P.3d 461 (Kan. 2011). But see State v. Stahl, 855 N.E.2d 834 (Ohio 2006) (4-3 opinion holding rape victim’s statement to nurse collecting rape kit in coordination with police not testimonial); State v. Krasky, 736 N.W.2d 636 (Minn. 2007) (child statements to nurse in conjunction with police investigation not testimonial); Griner v. State, 899 A.2d 189 (Md. App. 2006) (child statements to nurse after police arranged for him to be admitted to pediatric ward not testimonial).

b. Police not yet directly involved: If the police are not yet involved, this presents a closer question. As an initial matter, some states exclude statements identifying an alleged perpetrator as falling outside the medical treatment hearsay exception. See Taylor v. State, 268 S.W.3d 571 (Tex. Crim. 2008); Commonwealth v. DeOliveira, 849 N.E.2d 218 (Mass. 2006). But even if state law renders accusatory statements that are unnecessary for the medical treatment – such as identifying “who did this” – generally admissible, they should be considered testimonial. See State v. Kirby, 908 A.2d 506 (Conn. 2006) (statements to emergency medical technician were not testimonial because they were germane to medical treatment and “did not identify assailant”).

i. SANE nurses and similar medical/forensic examiners: Statements to sexual assault nurse examiners (SANE’S) and similar interviewers are testimonial even if the police are not yet involved. Medina v. State, 143 P.3d 471 ( Nev. 2006); Hatley v. State, 722 S.E.2d 67 (Ga. 2012); James v. Commonwealth, 360 S.W.3d 189 (Ky. 2012); People v. Stechly, 870 N.E.2d 333 (Ill. 2007); People v. Vargas, 178 Cal. App. 4th 647 (2009). But see State v. Miller, 264 P.3d 461 (Kan. 2011) (statements to SANE nurse regarding medical condition not testimonial; State did not introduce statements identifying perpetrator); State v. Scacchetti, 711 N.W.2d 508 (Minn. 2006) (statements made during nurse’s examination at hospital unit designed to examine for signs of child abuse not testimonial); State v. Lee, 855 N.E.2d 834 (Ohio. App. 2005) (same regarding statements made to forensic nurse), aff’d without opinion, 856 N.E.2d 921 (Ohio 2006) (4-3 vote). As the Nevada Supreme Court put it, “SANE nurses . . . are trained to conduct sexual assault examinations. A particular duty of a SANE nurse is to gather evidence for possible criminal prosecution in cases of alleged sexual assault. SANE nurses do not provide medical treatment. They only examine the individual to get vital signs and a history from the victim.” Medina, 143 P.3d at 473; see generally United States v. Gardinier, 65 M.J. 60 (C.A.A.F. 2007); see generally Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner Programs, http://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/alphaList.aspx?alpha=S (describing protocols for SANE’S).

ii. Treating paramedics, doctors and nurses: Such interviewers, like SANE nurses, are typically required by state law to report suspicions of abuse and other criminal activity to the police. At the same time, such interviewers often need to gather information (at least concerning the origin of injuries, if not who did it), in order to deliver medical treatment. Most courts have ignored the former consideration in favor of the latter, holding that statements produced in this setting are nontestimonial. See People v. Cage, 155 P.3d 205 (Cal. 2007) (statements to ER doctor); State v. Harper, 770 N.W.2d 316 (Iowa 2009) (ER doctor); People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916 (Colo. 2006) (child’s statements to examining physician); State v.

15. **Statements to friends/family/acquaintances**: A “casual remark to an acquaintance,” even if it inculpates the defendant, is not testimonial. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. Indeed, most statements to friends, family, or acquaintances in the course of everyday affairs are not made with any anticipation of evidentiary use and thus are not testimonial. See, e.g., State v. Manuel, 697 N.W.2d 811 ¶¶ 43-53 (Wis. 2005) (collecting cases). But the Court has reserved the question whether statements to “private citizens” can ever be testimonial. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155 n.3. And it seems clear that at least some such statements should be – for instance, a person’s statement to his brother that he asks (or obviously expects) the brother to relay to the police. Indeed, Davis discussed approvingly an old English case in which the court excluded the statement a young rape victim made to her mother upon returning home from an assault. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 828 (discussing King v. Brasier, 1 Leach 199, 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (1779)); see also State v. Mechling, 633 S.E.2d 311 (W. Va. 2006) (interpreting the Court’s discussion of Brasier “to imply that statements made to someone other than law enforcement personnel may also be properly characterized as testimonial”); State v. Alvarez-Abrego, 233 P.3d 889 (Wash. App. 2010). Yet some courts have held that accusatory statements made to friends with at least a reasonable expectation of their being passed onto law enforcement were nontestimonial, even though the statements were not “casual” in any sense. See, e.g., Compan v. People, 121 P.3d 876 (Colo. 2005) (description to friend of sexual assault); United States v. Jordan, 399 F. Supp. 2d 706 (E.D. Va. 2005); Medina v. State, 143 P.3d 471 (Nev. 2006) (statement to neighbor describing rape that happened the day before not testimonial).

16. **Statements of confidential informants**: When a confidential informant gives information to a police officer for use in a criminal investigation, those statements are testimonial. United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662 (6th Cir. 2004); United States v. Anderson, 450 F.3d 294 (7th Cir. 2006); State v. Adams, 131 P.3d 556 (Kan. App. 2006), rev’d on other grounds, 153 P.3d 512 (Kan. 2007); United States v. Lopez-Medina, 620 F.3d 826 (10th Cir. 2010); Langham v. State, 305 S.W.3d 568 (Tex. Crim. 2010). Statements by an undercover informant to defendant or other nongovernmental personnel, during a conversation the informant knows the government is recording, is testimonial but implicates the Confrontation Clause only if used to prove the truth of the matter is asserts; if the statements are repeated for the jury only to put others’ statements

17. **Statements to confidential informants or undercover officers:** A statement to such a person in the course of allegedly criminal activity is at least generally not testimonial. *See Crawford*, 541 U.S. at 58 (“And *Bourjaily v. United States*, 483 U.S. 171, 181-84 (1987), admitted statements made unwittingly to [an FBI] informant after applying a more general test that did not make prior cross-examination an indispensable requirement.”); *United States v. Saget*, 377 F.3d 223 (2nd Cir. 2004) (statement to undercover informant not testimonial); *People v. Morgan*, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 224 (Cal. App. 2005) (statement unknowingly made to police officer not testimonial). But if the government really is trying to produce testimony rather than capture evidence of ongoing crime, the statements could be testimonial, especially if governmental involvement becomes a clearer touchstone in future cases for the testimonial inquiry. *See, e.g., United States v. Smalls*, 605 F.3d 765 (10th Cir. 2010) (Kelly, J. dissenting) (arguing that statements made to undercover informant placed in jail cell to elicit confession through “trickery” should have been considered testimonial). In other words, if one can argue that the government is really trying to circumvent the “testimonial” rule in order to insulate a witness’s narrative from a confrontation challenge, the declarant’s statements may be testimonial even without the declarant’s knowledge that his statements might be used for evidentiary purposes.

18. **Statements made to prosecution’s expert witnesses:** Such statements are testimonial when made in the course of the expert’s investigation or assessment, even if the expert is not a state employee, because “[t]he Confrontation Clause would offer too little protection if it could be avoided by assigning the job of interviewing witnesses to an independent contractor rather than an employee.” *People v. Goldstein*, 810 N.Y.S.2d 100 (N.Y. 2005); *In re Cesar L.*, 2006 WL 1633474 (Cal.App. 2006) (unpublished) (same).

19. **Statements regarding potential future crimes:** A statement bearing testimonial features does not lose that status simply because the crime it predicts or assumes will happen has not yet occurred. *See State v. Jensen*, 727 N.W.2d 518 (Wis. 2007) (letter given to friend to give to police “if anything ever happen[ed]” to declarant was testimonial); *State v. Sanchez*, 177 P.3d 444 (Mont. 2008) (note given to friend describing husband’s threat that he would kill her if he found out she was cheating was testimonial); *State v. Hull*, 788 N.W.2d 81 (Minn. 2010) (similar statement to a friend testimonial); *but see Turner v. State*, 641 S.E.2d 527 (Ga. 2007) (statements to co-workers saying if declarant ever got killed it would be his wife were not testimonial).

forensic evidence are also testimonial to the extent that they are formal assertions made primarily for evidentiary purposes.

21. **Machine-generated printouts:** The Supreme Court has not decided, see *Bullcoming*, 131 S. Ct. at 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part), and lower court judges have split over, whether or to what extent machine-generated print-outs are testimonial. Insofar as such printouts are the machine talking, they are nontestimonial because machines cannot be witnesses. But insofar as they (or portions thereof, such as a defendant’s name or a sample number on a page with a graph) are the product of human manipulation and intervention, they are testimonial. For a discussion and debate of this issue in the context of forensic print-outs, compare the majority and dissenting opinions in *United States v. Washington*, 498 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir. 2007).

22. **Equipment maintenance certifications:** Before *Melendez-Diaz*, one court held that a certification that a breathalyzer is working properly is testimonial, while all others have held that it was not. *Compare Shiver v. State*, 900 So.2d 615 (Fla. App. 2005) (testimonial) with, e.g., *Commonwealth v. Walther*, 189 S.W.3d 570 (Ky. 2006) (not testimonial because not created for use in any particular investigation). *Melendez-Diaz* states that “documents prepared in the regular course of equipment maintenance may well qualify as nontestimonial statements.” 129 S. Ct. at 2532 n.1; *see also Matthies v. State*, ___ S.2d ___, 2012 WL 1216232 (Miss. 2012) (holding 5-4 that calibration records are nontestimonial); *State v. Ducasse*, 8 A.3d 1252 (Me. 2010) (specification on blood collection tubes that their material will not disturb integrity of samples nontestimonial).

23. **Medical records:** Customary medical reports “created for treatment purposes” are nontestimonial. *Melendez-Diaz*, 129 S. Ct. at 2533 n.2 (citing two cases involving blood tests performed for the purpose of administering medical treatment); *see also Commonwealth v. Lampron*, 839 N.E.2d 870 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (typical hospital records noting drug use not testimonial); *State v. Melton*, 625 S.E.2d 609 (N.C. App. 2006) (lab report confirming defendant tested positive for herpes); *United States v. Magyari*, 63 M.J. 123 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (holding before *Melendez-Diaz* that report of random, administrative urinalysis report is nontestimonial but that “the same types of records . . . prepared at the behest of law enforcement in anticipation of prosecution” may be testimonial).

24. **Law enforcement records**

   a. **Police reports:** These are testimonial because they are created for an investigatory/prosecutorial purpose. *State v. Lahai*, 18 A.3d 630 (Conn. App. 2011); *see also Melendez-Diaz*, 129 S. Ct. at 2538 (assuming same).

   b. **Bench warrants:** Courts hold that these are nontestimonial because they are issued for law enforcement purposes unconnected to trial. *State v. Carter*, 241 P.3d 1205 (Or. App. 2010); *Jackson v. United States*, 924 A.2d 1016 (D.C. 2007).

   c. **Reports of deportation:** *United States v. Torres-Villalobos*, 487 F.3d 607 (8th Cir. 2007) (noting unanimous view of five federal circuits to address the issue holding that
reports of deportation, produced at time of deportation and later used at prosecutions for illegal reentry, are not testimonial).


25. Other reports: Other types of reports yielding litigation include:

a. Certification of jurisdictional element of crime: United States v. Sandles, 469 F.3d 508 (6th Cir. 2006) (FDIC official’s affidavit to establish that bank was insured by FDIC was testimonial).

b. Disciplinary records: Courts are divided over whether records from a detention center introduced at the sentencing phase of a capital trial to prove an aggravating factor are testimonial. Compare Rousseau v. State, 171 S.W.3d 871 (Tex. Crim. 2005) (testimonial); United States v. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1115 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (same if the incident is sufficiently serious to trigger independent punishment), with State v. Raines, 653 S.E.2d 126 (N.C. 2007) (nontestimonial). One court has held that public school disciplinary records are testimonial. In re D.K., 924 N.E.2d 270 (Ohio App. 2009).

26. Certifications concerning business or public records: Although records generated without an eye toward litigation are nontestimonial, certifications respecting such records that are created for “the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial” are testimonial. It does not matter whether local hearsay law characterizes such certifications also as “business records” or “public records.” Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2538-39. Specific types of certifications include:

a. Certifications of nonexistence of records (CNR’s): A “clerk’s certificate attesting to the fact that the clerk [] searched for a particular record and failed to find it” is testimonial, at least when it “serve[s] as substantive evidence against the defendant whose guilt depend[s] on the nonexistence of the record for which the clerk searched.” Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2539; see also Tabaka v. District of Columbia, 976 A.2d 173 (D.C. 2009) (nonexistence of driving permit); United States v. Martinez-Rios, 595 F.3d 581 (5th Cir. 2010) (nonexistence of record permitting reentry into United States); United States v. Orozco-Acosta, 607 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 2010) (same); United States v. Norwood, 595 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2010) (nonexistence of employment records); Washington v. State, 18 So.3d 1221 (Fla. App. 2009) (nonexistence of contracting license); State v. Jasper, 271 P.3d 876 (Wash. 2012) (nonexistence of reinstatement of driving privileges or registration of business).

b. Affidavits or certifications describing or summarizing records: A clerk’s certification “interpret[ing],” or describing the “substance or effect” or a public record is testimonial. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2539; see also United States v. Smith, 640 F.3d 358 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (letter from court clerk summarizing record of conviction); Commonwealth v. Parenteau, 948 N.E.2d 883 (Mass. 2011) (certificate attesting to fact that a notice of revocation of driving privileges had been mailed testimonial); People v. Pacer, 847 N.E.2d 1149 (N.Y. 2006) (affidavit of DMV records manager concerning

c. **Certifications of authenticity:** A clerk’s certification that does nothing more than attest to “the correctness of a copy of [an official] record kept in his office” is not testimonial. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2538. It is unclear whether this rule applies to authentications of private business records as well, for there is no similar historical pedigree for the rule in that context. But courts thus far have held that the rule applies equally to certifications regarding business records. See United States v. Yeley-Davis, 632 F.3d 673 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v. Jackson, 636 F.3d 687 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920, 927 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Weiland, 420 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2005).

27. **Chain-of-custody affidavits:** “It is up to the prosecution to decide what steps in the chain of custody are so crucial as to require evidence,” but to the extent the prosecution offers such evidence, it must do so via “live” witnesses. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 n.1. See also City of Las Vegas v. Walsh, 124 P.3d 203 (Nev. 2005) (nurse’s chain-of-custody affidavit concerning method of conducting and preserving blood alcohol test is testimonial), cited with approval in Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2540 n.11; United States v. Sweeney, 70 M.J. 296 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (same regarding chain-of-custody document regarding urinalysis).

C. **Nontestimonial Statements:** Davis makes it clear that the Confrontation Clause does not apply to nontestimonial evidence. 547 U.S. at 824. That is not to say, however, that the Due Process Clause does not still require hearsay evidence to have some level of reliability – as it was doing before the Roberts framework took hold. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 163 n.15 (1970) (“[W]e may agree that considerations of due process, wholly apart from the Confrontation Clause, might prevent convictions where a reliable evidentiary basis is totally lacking.”); Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 106 (1977) (Due Process Clause forbids testimony that lacks “sufficient aspects of reliability” to be evaluated by the jury”); United States v. Shoupe, 548 F.2d 636, 643-44 (6th Cir. 1977) (holding that disavowed, unsworn, and uncorroborated hearsay statement was insufficiently reliable to satisfy due process). And at least one state has decided as a matter of state constitutional law to continue applying the Roberts framework to nontestimonial statements. See State v. Fields, 169 P.3d 955 (Haw. 2007).

III. ADMISSIBILITY OF TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE

The Confrontation Clause allows the prosecution to introduce testimonial evidence only if one of the following circumstances is present:
A. **Witness Takes the Stand:** Generally speaking, “when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of prior testimonial statements. . . . The Clause does not bar the admission of a statement so long as the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it.” *Crawford*, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9. Issues sometimes arise with respect to a defendant’s actual ability to cross-examine the witness or state statutes imposing prerequisites for doing so.

1. **Witness claims memory loss.** A defendant has an adequate opportunity to cross-examine even if the witness claims to have (or really does have) memory problems. *United States v. Owens*, 484 U.S. 554 (1988) (no confrontation violation even though head injury impaired witness’s memory after he gave testimonial statement, so cross-examination was of limited utility); *California v. Green*, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (same with respect to witness claimed memory loss at trial); see also *Cooley v. State*, 867 A.2d 1065 (Md. 2005) (testimonial statement admissible where witness recanted on the stand). At least one state, however, has rejected *Owens* on state constitutional law grounds and held that a adequate opportunity to cross does not exist when the witness cannot remember giving the testimonial statement or the events in question. *Goforth v. State*, 70 So.3d 174 (Miss. 2011).

2. **Witness invokes privilege.** If the witness is forced to take the stand but refuses on privilege grounds to answer any questions on direct at all, this does not constitute an opportunity for cross examination. See *Douglas v. Alabama*, 380 U.S. 415 (1965).

3. **Witness does not give substantive testimony on direct examination.** Even if the prosecution puts a witness on the stand, it may not introduce her prior testimonial statements if it does not at least first ask the witness to relay the substance of the statements in court. *People v. Learn*, 899 N.E.2d 1076 (Ill. App. 2009). The Confrontation Clause “requires the State to elicit damaging testimony from the witness so the defendant may cross examine if he so chooses.” *State v. Rohrich*, 939 P.3d 697 (Wash. 1997); see also *Melendez-Diaz*, 129 S. Ct. at 2540 (“[T]he Confrontation Clause imposes a burden on the prosecution to present its witnesses.”). When the prosecution asks the witness to relay her damaging testimony and the witness is nonresponsive, courts have held that the prior statement is then admissible. See *State v. Nyhammer*, 963 A.2d 316 (N.J. 2009); *State v. Perry*, 275 S.W.3d 237 (Mo. 2009); *State v. Kennedy*, 957 So.2d 757 (La. 2007), rev’d on other grounds, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008).

4. **Witness refuses or is unable to answer questions on cross.** Some courts have held that the defendant has an adequate opportunity to examine a recalcitrant witness who takes the stand but refuses to answer any substantive questions, unless and until the witness is held in contempt. *State v. Fowler*, 829 N.E.2d 459 (Ind. 2005) (rejecting confrontation claim because defendant did not ask trial judge to make witness answer questions on pain of contempt). But if the defendant asks for the witness to be held in contempt and the witness still refuses to answer, then the defendant lacks on adequate opportunity for cross. *State v. Johnson-Howell*, 881 P.2d 1288, 1300 (Kan. 1994). Another decision holds that a defendant lacks an adequate opportunity for cross-examination if the witness breaks down in the middle of the cross and does not continue. *State v. Noah*, 162 P.3d 799 (Kan. 2007). Still another holds that if a “child is so young that she cannot be cross-
examined at all . . . the fact that she is physically present in the courtroom should not, in and of itself, satisfy the demands of the Confrontation Clause.” *United States v. War Bonnett*, 933 F.2d 1471, 1474 (8th Cir. 1991); *see also Laredo v. State*, 194 S.W.3d 637 (Tex. App. 2006) (same outcome under state law when witness refused to answer questions about incident).

5. **Defendant needs interpreter to understand witness.** One court has held that if the witness has trouble understanding English and, thus, cannot effectively understand and answer questions, the failure to provide an interpreter to aid in cross examination violates the Confrontation Clause. *Miller v. State*, 177 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App. 2004).

6. **Witness is no longer on the stand.** The prosecution must offer a witness’s prior testimonial statements while the witness is testifying on direct examination. Accordingly, several courts have held that the prosecution cannot introduce such statements after the witness has been excused, leaving it to the defendant to recall the witness for cross-examination. *See Felix v. State*, 849 P.2d 220, 247 (Nev. 1993) (“As a practical matter, if a child is excused before her hearsay statements are proffered, the defense has no opportunity to cross-examine the child on those statements. . . . Arguably, the defense could have recalled Susan and other children for cross-examination. However, we conclude that placing that burden on the defense is unfair.”); *State v. Daniels*, 682 P.2d 173, 178-79 (Mont. 1984) (where declarant is excused as a witness prior to the offering of the declarant’s out-of-court statement, declarant was “not subject to cross-examination concerning the statement” and therefore out-of-court statement was inadmissible); *State v. Rohrich*, 939 P.2d 697 (Wisc. 2007); *People v. Cowan*, 236 P.3d 1074 (Cal. 2010); *State v. Hoch*, 18 A.3d 562 (Vt. 2011); *State v. Richards*, 47 So.3d 598 (La. App. 2010). *See generally* Christopher B. Mueller, *Cross Examination Earlier or Later: When is it Enough to Satisfy Crawford*, 19 Regent L. Rev. 319 (2006-07).

7. **Witness testifies based on another person’s testimonial statements.** The prosecution cannot introduce one person’s testimonial statements through the in-court testimony of another. It does not matter whether the in-court witness is an effective substitute for the out-of-court witness. “The [Confrontation] Clause does not tolerate dispensing with confrontation simply because the court believes that questioning one witness about another’s testimonial statements provides a fair enough opportunity for cross-examination.” *Bullcoming v. New Mexico*, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2716 (2011). Thus, when the State in *Bullcoming* “elected to introduce Caylor’s certification, Caylor became a witness Bullcoming had a right to confront.” *Id.; see also United States v. Moore*, 651 F.3d 30 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (same result even if testifying witness performed a contemporaneous review of the nontestifying analyst’s report). At the same time, the Confrontation Clause does not require the prosecution to produce someone involved in a forensic analysis or other event if the prosecution does not introduce that person’s statements and the in-court witness testifies entirely based on his or her own personal observations and conclusions. *Smith v. State*, 28 So.3d 838 (Fla. 2009), *cert. denied*, 131 S. Ct. 3087 (2011); *Commonwealth v. Barbosa*, 933 N.E. 2d 93 (Mass. 2010), *cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 2441 (2011); State v. Gomez, 244 P.3d 1163 (Ariz. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2460 (2011). In between these two poles, “[t]he relevant question is whether the way the prosecutor solicited the [witness’s in-court] testimony made the source and content of the [out of court testimonial statement] clear. . . . If the substance of the prohibited evidence is evident even though it was not introduced in its prohibited form,” the Confrontation Clause is violated. Ryan v. Miller, 303 F.3d 231, 249-50 (2d Cir. 2002). In other words, the Confrontation Clause prohibits a witness from testifying in a manner that allows the jury to infer the substance of a nontestifying witness’s testimonial statements, but not in a way that does not.

a. Police officer testimony. Courts have little difficulty applying this rule in the context of police officers testifying in a manner such that jury could have inferred the substance of a nontestifying witness’s testimonial statements in a police interview. State v. Swaney, 787 N.W.2d 481 (Minn. 2010); United States v. Meises, 645 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 2011) (same); Wheeler v. State, 36 A.3d 310 (Del. 2012); Hutchins v. Wainwright, 715 F.2d 512, 516 (11th Cir. 1983); Farve v. Henderson, 464 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1972) (same). In fact, one federal court of appeals has found this rule sufficiently clearly established to warrant habeas relief. Ocampo v. Vail, 649 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2011), pet’n for cert filed (No. 11-614).

b. Forensic testimony. The Court has granted cert and will hear argument in the 2011 Term in a case, Williams v. Illinois, 939 N.E.2d 268 (Ill. 2010), in which a forensic analyst gave DNA testimony based in part on someone else’s lab report that was not introduced into evidence. It is unclear the extent to which the testifying witness conveyed the other lab’s findings to the jury, but the testifying witness did assert that the defendant’s DNA matched the DNA in the sample worked up by the other lab.

B. Waivers and Stipulations: “The right to confrontation may, of course, be waived, including by failure to object to the offending evidence; and States may adopt procedural rules governing the exercise of such objections.” Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2534 n.3. The right, just like any other right, also can be relinquished by a stipulation allowing the prosecution to introduce testimonial hearsay as a substitute for live testimony. However, “for a waiver to be effective it must be clearly established that there was ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’” Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966) (quotation omitted). Thus, any waiver must be clear, and an attorney cannot waive the right to stipulate to the admission of an out-of-court testimonial statement over the defendant’s objection. United States v. Williams, 632 F.3d 129 (4th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases).

1. Simple “notice and demand” statutes - Many states have statutes that “require the prosecution to provide notice to the defendant of its intent to use an analyst’s report as evidence at trial, after which the defendant is given a period of time in which he may object to the admission of the evidence absent the analyst’s appearance at trial.” The Court in Melendez-Diaz held that such statutes are constitutional. 129 S. Ct. at 2541 & n.12; see also Hinojos-Mendoza v. People, 169 P.3d 662, 670 (Colo. 2007). Still, such statutes or notices must adequately warn that failing to request live testimony would waive their constitutional rights. State v. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 304 (Minn. 2006)
(inaugurate warning); State v. Smith, 2006 WL 846342 (Ohio App. 2006) (same). See also Cropper v. People, 251 P.3d 434 (Colo. 2011) (providing lab report is sufficient notice when statute is clear on its face).

2. **Notice and demand statutes requiring pretrial showings or affirmations from defendant** – A handful of states require defendants to make a pretrial showing that they have a “good faith” reason to demand that a prosecution introduce live testimony from a forensic examiner instead of submitting a report, or to affirm under oath an intent to cross-examine the analyst. Most courts have held that such statutes cannot constitutionally require defendants to offer any specific reason for desiring confrontation or to make any substantive showing that there are grounds to cross-examine. State v. Cunningham, 903 So.2d 1110 (La. 2005) & State v. Simmons, 78 So.2d 743 (La. 2012); State v. Miller, 790 A.2d 144 (N.J. 2002); Miller v. State, 472 S.E.2d 74 (Ga. 1996); State v. Christensen, 607 A.2d 952 (N.H.1992). The reasoning of Melendez-Diaz strongly suggests that the latter courts are correct, but the Court stopped short of expressly resolving the issue. 129 S. Ct. at 2541 n.12. Two state supreme courts upheld such prerequisites prior to Melendez-Diaz. See City of Las Vegas v. Walsh, 124 P.3d 203 (Nev. 2005); State v. Crow, 974 P.2d 100, 111 (Kan. 1999). But one of those courts has since reversed itself. State v. Laturner, 163 P.3d 367, 218 P.3d 23 (Kan. 2009).

3. **Requiring defendant to subpoena witness** – A defendant’s ability to subpoena a witness “is no substitute for the right of confrontation.” Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2540. “[T]he Confrontation Clause imposes a burden on the prosecution to present its witnesses, not on the defendant to bring those adverse witnesses into court.” Id. But see Rodriguez v. State, 245 P.3d 818 (Wyo. 2010) (no violation when defendant actually called witness whose testimonial statements the prosecution had offered to the stand). Some states avoid transgressing this constitutional rule by construing statutory subpoena requirements as nothing more than the requiring that defendants give notice that they want the prosecution to call the witness in their case-in-chief. See, e.g., State v. Cunningham, 903 So.2d 1110 (La. 2005); State v. Simbara, 811 A.2d 448 (N.J. 2002); People v. Monica-Simental, 73 P.3d 15 (Colo. 2003). See also Thomas v. United States, 914 A.2d 1 (D.C. 2006) (finding constitutional violation but construing statute this way to avoid future violations); State v. Birchfield, 157 P.3d 216 (Or. 2007) (applying state constitutional law to reduce subpoena requirement to mere notice requirement). On such “simple notice and demand” requirements, see supra subsection 1.

C. **Unavailability and a Prior Opportunity for Cross-Examination**

1. **Unavailability**

“[T]he prosecution bears the burden of establishing” that a witness is unavailable. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 75 (1980). Crawford does not appear to change what constitutes unavailability under Roberts or any other pre-Crawford case, but it makes this area of law much more important. Potential causes of unavailability include:
a. Physical Unavailability

i. **Death** – When a witness has died, he is unavailable. *See Mattox v. United States*, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).

ii. **Government cannot locate witness at the time of trial** – A witness is unavailable if a witness has unexpectedly gone missing and the prosecution cannot find the witness, “despite good faith efforts undertaken prior to trial to locate and present that witness.” *Ohio v. Roberts*, 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980). “The lengths to which the prosecution must go to produce a witness . . . is a question of reasonableness.” *Id.* (quotation omitted). Reasonableness depends, in part, on the importance of the witness; the more important, the more strenuous the government’s efforts must be. *See, e.g., Brooks v. United States*, 39 A.3d 873 (D.C. 2012) (citing cases). If the government has not undertaken reasonable attempts to produce the witness, then the witness is not unavailable. *See, e.g., Barber v. Page*, 390 U.S. 719, 722-25 (1969); *Hernandez v. State*, 188 P.3d 1126 (Nev. 2008) (insufficient effort on State’s part when simply accepted claim at time of trial of “family emergency” and did not investigate in any way); *State v. King*, 706 N.W.2d 181 (Wis. App. 2005) (insufficient effort when contacted witness several times, learned of her reluctance to appear, and failed to issue subpoena). For example, it is not enough for the prosecution to issue a subpoena to a witness whom it knows may not respond; the prosecution must actively seek the witness’s participation. *State v. Cox*, 779 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 2010); *State v. Sharp*, 327 S.W.3d 704 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2010). Similarly, if the prosecution is unable to produce the witness at the time of trial in part because it failed to take reasonable steps in advance to ensure that it would be able to do so, the witness is not unavailable. *Compare Motes v. United States*, 178 U.S. 458, 470-71 (1900) (witness not unavailable when governmental negligence allowed witness it was holding in custody to abscond), *with People v. Bunyard*, 200 P.3d 879 (Cal. 2009) (witness was unavailable when prosecution released him on own recognizance and he promised to reappear and did not pose a flight risk).

iii. **Witness is beyond the court’s jurisdiction** – A witness is unavailable if a witness is permanently or at least indefinitely beyond the court’s jurisdiction and “the state is powerless to compel his attendance . . . either through its own process or through established procedures.” *Mancusi v. Stubbs*, 408 U.S. 204, 208 (1972). But if the prosecution knows where the witness is, and “procedures exist[] whereby the witness could be brought to the trial, and the witness is not in a position to frustrate efforts to secure his production,” a witness outside the jurisdiction is not unavailable. *Roberts*, 448 U.S. at 77 (discussing holding in *Barber v. Page*, 390 U.S. 719 (1969)).

iv. **Witness has been deported** – As with missing witnesses, the government has a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent jurisdictional absence from inhibiting its witnesses’ giving live testimony. Courts, therefore, have ruled that when a witness cannot testify at a federal trial because the government deported him, the witness is not “unavailable” for confrontation purposes unless the government took steps
prior to the deportation to secure the witness’s presence at trial. *United States v. Yida*, 498 F.3d 945 (9th Cir. 2007); *United States v. Tirado-Tirado*, 563 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 2009). When the federal government deports a witness without a state knowing it being able to stop it, then the witness is unavailable. *See People v. Herrera*, 232 P.3d 710 (Cal. 2010) (state unaware of deportation); *Morgan v. Commonwealth*, 650 S.E.2d 541 (Va. App. 2007) (state tried to stop deportation).

v. **Witness refuses to testify on pain of contempt** – One court has held that a witness who is threatened with, and accepts, being held in contempt of court for refusal to testify, is unavailable. *State v. Lehr*, 254 P.3d 379 (Ariz. 2011).

vi. **Illness** – The Supreme Court has never addressed this issue. Although there was “considerable contrariety of opinion” on the subject at common law, the modern trend is that a witness is unavailable if what appears to be a permanent illness prevents a witness from appearing in court. *Spencer v. State*, 112 N.W. 462, 463 (Wis. 1907).

b. **Mental infirmity**

i. **Incompetency** - Lower courts have held that when a witness (usually a young child) is incompetent to testify, she is unavailable. *See, e.g., State v. C.J.*, 63 P.3d 765, 771 (Wash. 2003) (incompetence establishes unavailability). The Supreme Court, however, has never resolved this issue. *Idaho v. Wright*, 497 U.S. 805, 816 (1990) (“assuming without deciding” that incompetence satisfies unavailability test).

ii. **Inability to remember (feigned or actual)** – A witness who takes the stand but claims, truthfully or not, that he cannot remember the events at issue is not unavailable. *United States v. Owens*, 484 U.S. 554 (1988) (head injury impaired witness’s memory after he gave testimonial statement); *California v. Green*, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (claimed memory loss at trial).

c. **Invocation of privilege** - When a valid privilege, such as the Fifth Amendment or marital privilege, stands in the way of witness taking the stand at trial, lower courts have held that the witness is unavailable. The Supreme Court has never resolved the issue. *See Lilly v. Virginia*, 527 U.S. 116, 124 (1999) (plurality opinion) (Fifth Amendment) (assuming Fifth Amendment invocation establishes unavailability); *State v. Crawford*, 54 P.3d 656 (Wash. 2002) (marital privilege establishes unavailability).

d. **Defendant procures witness’s absence** – If the defendant causes a witness’s unavailability, the witness is unavailable. But forfeiture may apply. For a discussion of the forfeiture doctrine, see *infra* section III.D.1.

2. **Prior opportunity for cross-examination**: If the defendant was represented by counsel who had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witness and the same or similar motive for doing so, this satisfies the Confrontation Clause for statements given at that time. *See Mancusi v. Stubbs*, 408 U.S. 204, 213-16 (1972) (adequate cross because statement given at prior trial on same charges). Issues generating litigation include:
a. **Pretrial hearings.** If a jurisdiction allows the defense at the hearing at issue to examine the witness to substantially the same extent (and on the same material) as would be the case at trial, then this is an adequate opportunity for cross. *Compare Roberts,* 488 U.S. at 70-73 (adequate opportunity where statement was given at preliminary hearing where defendant was represented by counsel); *California v. Green,* 399 U.S. 149, 165-68 (1970) (same). The critical question, therefore, is not exactly what type of hearing is at issue but rather the extent of cross examination that was possible and allowed. *Compare Chavez v. State,* 213 P.3d 476 (Nev. 2009) (adequate opportunity at preliminary hearing); *State v. Skakel,* 888 A.2d 985 (Conn. 2006) (adequate opportunity at probable cause hearing); *Commonwealth v. Hurley,* 455 Mass. 53 (Mass. 2009) (adequate opportunity at pretrial detention hearing); *State v. Douglas,* 800 P.3d 288, 293 (Or. 1990) (adequate opportunity at bond hearing); *United States v. Doyle,* 621 F. Supp. 2d 337 (W.D. Va. 2009) (same); *Barnes v. State,* 349 S.E.2d 387, 388 (Ga. 1986) (adequate opportunity at committal hearing); *United States v. Poland,* 659 F.2d 884, 896 (9th Cir. 1981) (adequate opportunity at suppression hearing), *Williams v. State,* 447 S.E.2d 676 (Ga. App. 1994) (same); *Coffin v. State,* 850 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. App. 1993) (adequate opportunity at adult certification hearing); *Petit v. State,* ___ So.3d ___, 2012 WL 1314153 (Fla. App. 2012) (adequate opportunity at bond hearing), *with Pointer v. Texas,* 380 U.S. 400, 406-08 (1965) (inadequate opportunity when statement given in preliminary hearing where defendant was not represented by counsel); *Dickson v. State,* 636 S.E.2d 721 (Ga. App. 2006) (inadequate opportunity at bond hearing); *People v. Brown,* 870 N.E.2d 1033 (Ill. App. 2007) (same); *People v. Vera,* 395 N.W.2d 339 (Mich. App. 1986); *State v. Weaver,* 917 So. 2d 600 (La. App. 2005) (inadequate opportunity at pretrial suppression hearing); and *People v. Fry,* 92 P.3d 970 (Colo. 2004) (inadequate opportunity at all preliminary hearings because state law requires such hearings to be truncated); *State v. Stuart,* 695 N.W.2d 259 (Wis. 2005) (same because state law precludes challenges to witnesses’ credibility at such hearings).

b. **Discovery depositions.** Courts are divided over whether a discovery deposition provides an adequate opportunity for cross. *Compare State v. Contreras,* 979 So.2d 896 (Fla. 2008) (not adequate), *with Howard v. State,* 853 N.E.2d 461 (Ind. 2006) (adequate).

c. **Pre-indictment depositions.** In light of *Crawford,* one district court has allowed the government to conduct a pre-indictment deposition in order to preserve testimony of a gravely ill witness for trial. *In re Grand Jury Proceedings,* 697 F. Supp. 2d 262 (D.R.I. 2010).

d. **Civil cases.** One court has held that an adequate opportunity for cross-examination existed in deposition in civil case because defendant was represented by same attorney and criminal charges already had been filed with respect to same facts. *Simmons v. State,* 234 S.W.3d 321 (Ark. App. 2006).

e. **Later arising evidence.** A defendant’s prior opportunity to cross is not adequate if new evidence later arises that would have been important for purposes cross-examining the witness. *Compare Commonwealth v. Bazemore,* 614 A.2d 684 (Pa. 1992) (prior opportunity not adequate because defendant unaware at preliminary hearing of witness’s prior inconsistent statement to police and that district attorney was contemplating filing
charges against witness); People v. McCambry, 578 N.E.2d 1224 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (not adequate because defendant was unaware the lineup in which the witness had identified him was suggestive); People v. Reed, 414 N.Y.S.2d 89 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979) (not adequate because defendant was unaware of witness’s chronic alcoholism); People v. Torres, 962 N.E.2d 919 (Ill. 2012). But see People v. Jurado, 131 P.3d 400 (Cal. 2006) (adequate because no prosecutorial wrongdoing). The Confrontation Clause is not implicated if the later arising evidence is not important in light of the first cross-examination. Hanson v. State, 206 P.3d 1020 (Ok. Crim. 2009); State v. Estrella, 893 A.2d 348, 358-60 (Conn. 2006).

f. Counsel for someone else cross-examined. If a party other than the defendant cross-examined the witness at a prior hearing, that does not satisfy the Confrontation Clause. State v. Hale, 691 N.W.2d 637 (Wis. 2005); Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 54-57 (1899) (inadequate opportunity when statement was given at prior trial where defendant was not a party and thus had no opportunity to cross-examine).

D. Equitable Loss of the Right.

There are two types of circumstances in which the prosecution may be able to introduce testimonial statements of unavailable witnesses even if the defendant did not have a prior opportunity to cross-examine them.

1. “Forfeiture by wrongdoing.” When defendants wrongfully prevent witnesses from testifying or from reporting a crime to law enforcement, this “extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158-59 (1879)); accord Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2279-80. For some classic examples of forfeiture, see United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 651 (2nd Cir. 2001) (“threats, actual violence, or murder” forfeit confrontation right); State v. Hand, 840 N.E.2d 151 (Ohio 2006), (forfeiture because defendant killed witness to prevent testimony); People v. Jones, 714 N.W.2d 362 (Mich. App. 2006) (threats delivered through third party establishes forfeiture); State v. Ivy, 188 S.W.3d 132 (Tenn. 2006) (killing witness to prevent her from testifying against defendant in assault prosecution establishes forfeiture in later murder prosecution); People v. Banos, 178 Cal. App. 4th 483 (2010) (dissuading witness from reporting crime); People v. Ware, 2005 WL 563216 (Mich. App. 2005) (unpublished) (good explanation of law in post-Crawford opinion). In some jurisdictions, wrongdoing must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., People v. Geraci, 649 N.E.2d 817 (N.Y. 1995). In most, however, a preponderance of the evidence suffices – though even there “a trial court cannot make a forfeiture finding based solely on the unavailable witness’s un confronted testimony; there must be independent corroborative evidence that supports the forfeiture finding.” People v. Giles, 152 P.3d 433 (Cal. 2007), rev’d on other grounds, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008); see State v. Hale, 691 N.W.2d 637, 653 (Wis. Jan. 2005) (Prosser, J., concurring) (collecting citations to different jurisdictions). Nor may a trial court conduct a forfeiture hearing in an ex parte setting. State v. Byrd, 967 A.2d 285 (N.J. 2009). Some specific issues that have generated litigation:
a. Alleged wrongdoing that causes unavailability but is not specifically aimed at preventing testimony. The Supreme Court held in *Giles v. California*, 128 S. Ct. 2679 (2008), that conduct that causes a witnesses’ unavailability but was not designed, or intended, to prevent a witness from testifying does not forfeit the right to confrontation. Although intent must be shown, one court has held that preventing testimony need not be the person’s primary purpose. *State v. Supanchick*, 263 P.3d 378 (Or. App. 2011). Acts of domestic violence that are meant to isolate the victim and to prevent her from seeking aid from law enforcement and the judicial process satisfy this intent requirement. *Id.* at 2692-93.

b. Collusion with witness. When a defendant colludes with a witness to procure his/her unavailability, one court has held this is sufficient to trigger forfeiture. *Commonwealth v. Edwards*, 830 N.E.2d 158 (Mass. 2005); see also *Commonwealth v. Szerlong*, 933 N.E.2d 633 (Mass. 2010) (marrying witness in order to claim spousal privilege constituted forfeiture).

c. Coconspirator causes unavailability. When a coconspirator’s misconduct causes a witness’ unavailability, one court has held that the defendant forfeits his right to confrontation when the misconduct “was within the scope of the conspiracy and reasonably foreseeable to the defendant.” *United States v. Carson*, 455 F.3d 336, 364 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

d. Threats/promises unconnected to investigation or prosecution: One court has held that simply making an alleged victim of abuse “swear not to tell anyone what happened” does not forfeit the confrontation right because the promise is not extracted in contemplation of a future trial.” *In re Rolandis G.*, 902 N.E.2d 600 (Ill. 2008).

e. Defendant absconds. When a defendant absconds and a witness becomes unavailable the meantime, courts have refused to find forfeiture, reasoning that the defendants’ wrongdoing did not cause the witnesses’ unavailability. *See State v. Alvarez-Lopez*, 98 P.3d 699 (N.M. 2004); *State v. Weaver*, 733 N.W.2d 793 (Minn. App. 2007).


g. Retaliation for previous testimony. One court has held that killing a person in retaliation for previous testimony does not constitute forfeiture because it does not relate to future testimony. *United States v. Henderson*, 626 F.3d 326 (6th Cir. 2010).

2. “Opening the door.” Courts have divided over whether a defendant “opens the door,” on equitable grounds similar to forfeiture, to the prosecution’s introducing an incriminating testimonial statement when a defendant introduces part of that statement or another of the declarant’s prior statements. *Compare United States v. Cromer*, 389 F.3d 662 (6th Cir. 2004) (testimonial statement still inadmissible against defendant); *People v. Ryan*, 790 N.Y.S.2d 723 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (same); *State v. Hull*, 788

E. Testimonial Statements Purportedly Offered For a Nonhearsay Purpose

Generally speaking, introducing testimonial statements for a nonhearsay purpose does not raise a confrontation problem. “The [Confrontation Clause] does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted. See Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985).” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9. But when testimonial statements directly incriminate the defendant such that there is a substantial risk that they jury will disregard limiting instructions, Street still requires the prosecution to show that the prosecution has a genuine need to introduce the evidence for its nonhearsay purpose and that the statement cannot be redacted or rephrased (as is done pursuant to Bruton) to blunt the risk of improper use while still accommodating the prosecution’s legitimate need. Compare United States v. Cruz-Diaz, 550 F.2d 169 (1st Cir. 2008) (statement admissible because it satisfied these requirements); United States v. Jiminez, 564 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2009) (same), with United States v. Mayfield, 189 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 1999) (statement inadmissible because statement was too prejudicial even with limiting instruction); White v. Cohen, 635 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981) (same). I have written about this issue: Jeffrey L. Fisher, The Truth About the “Not for Truth” Exception to Crawford, 32 The Champion 18 (Jan/Feb 2008). Two particular purported nonhearsay uses of testimonial statements are generating litigation:

1. Statements purportedly offered to explain police’s investigation. The Supreme Court and some lower courts have emphasized that police officers may not repeat direct accusations of criminal conduct in order to describe their investigation unless doing so is – just as in Street – truly necessary and the statement is redacted as much as possible to safeguard confrontation interests. See Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 103-04 (1933) (holding that the government could not introduce out-of-court accusation for nonhearsay purpose because the jury would not reasonably have been able to avoid considering it for the truth of the matter asserted; “[t]he reverberating clang of those accusatory words would drown out all weaker sounds”); United States v. Silva, 380 F.3d 1018, 1020 (7th Cir. 2004) (reversing conviction because of prejudicial effect of inculpatory hearsay supposedly offered for nonsubstantive purposes; “Under the prosecution’s theory, every time a person says to the police ‘X committed the crime,’ the statement (including all corroborating details) would be admissible to show why the police investigated X. That would eviscerate the constitutional right to confront and cross-examine one’s accusers.”); United States v. Adams, 628 F.3d 407 (7th Cir. 2010) (same); United States v. Hearn, 500 F.3d 479 (6th Cir. 2007) (same); State v. Johnson, 771 N.W. 2d (S.D. 2009) (same); United States v. Holmes, 620 F.3d 836 (8th Cir. 2010)
(same); *United States v. Cabrera-Rivera*, 583 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2009) (same); but see *Szymanski v. State*, 166 P.3d 879 (Wyo. 2007) (allowing incriminating statements to be admitted for dubious nonhearsay purpose). It is “most unusual,” upon close inspection, that the government has a genuine need to explain the course of its investigation. *See*, e.g., *Brown v. State*, 549 S.E.2d 107, 111 (Ga. 2001); *State v. Broadway*, 753 So.2d 801 (La. 1999); *compare United States v. Banks*, 645 F.3d 971 (8th Cir. 2011) (allowing introduction of testimonial statements to explain investigation because it was truly at issue). And even when the government does have a legitimate need to present such evidence, that need can often be accommodated by redacting the statement and/or allowing an officer to testify that he acted “upon information received” or words that effect. *United States v. Maher*, 454 F.3d 13, 23 (1st Cir. 2006); *United States v. Price*, 458 F.3d 202, 208 (3rd Cir. 2006); *State v. McLaughlin*, 14 A.3d 720 (N.J. 2011); *State v. Braxter*, 568 A.2d 311, 315 (R.I. 1990); *State v. Adams*, 131 P.3d 556 (Kan. App. 2006) (prosecutors may not “elicit[] unnecessary and damning details to establish the motivation for police investigation”), *rev’d on other grounds*, 153 P.3d 512 (Kan. 2007).¹

One federal court of appeals views these principles as so well settled that their violation warrants habeas relief on this basis. *Jones v. Basinger*, 685 F.3d 1030 (7th Cir. 2011).

### 2. Testimonial statements offered as support for the opinion of prosecutorial expert witnesses.

In *Williams v. Illinois*, the Supreme Court is considering whether a prosecutorial expert witness violates the Confrontation Clause when he testifies based upon testimonial statements made by another nontestifying person (for example, in interviews or in forensic lab reports). One of the Illinois Supreme Court’s holdings in that case was that the Clause permits this procedure because the testimonial statements under this circumstance are not introduced for the truth of the matter asserted.

### IV. HARMLESS ERROR

If a trial court erroneously admitted a testimonial statement at trial, that error is subject to “harmless error” analysis. *See*, e.g., *Lilly v. Virginia*, 527 U.S. 116, 139-40 (1999) (confrontation error subject to harmless error analysis); *Delaware v. Van Arsdell*, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) (same). In conducting the harmless-error inquiry, an appellate court should reverse if it is possible that the jury relied on the testimonial statement in reaching its verdict. *United States v. Alvarado-Valdez*, 521 F.3d 337, 342 (5th Cir. 2008). An appellate court may not simply ignore the testimonial statement and ask whether the jury clearly would have convicted based on the remaining evidence. *Id.; accord Fields v. United States*, 952A.2d 859 (D.C. 2008); *Duvall v. United States*, 975A.2d 839 (D.C. 2009).

¹ Jurisdictions may also impose nonconstitutional limitations on the prosecution’s ability to introduce testimonial statements for nonhearsay purposes. *See*, e.g., *United States v. Evans*, 216 F.3d 80, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2000); *State v. Smothers*, 927 So.2d 484 (La. App. 2006) (refusing on state law grounds to allow officer to describe content of 911 call that triggered his investigatory actions because “[m]arginally relevant nonhearsay evidence should not be used as a vehicle to permit the introduction of highly relevant and highly prejudicial hearsay evidence which consists of the substance of an out-of-court assertion that was not made under oath and was not subject to cross-examination at trial”) (quoting *McCormick on Evidence § 249* (3d ed. 1984)).